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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
State Court Reactions to Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.: Inconsistent Results and Reasoning
I.

INTRODUCTION

Historically, defamatory language' was believed to be outside
the protection of the first amendment. In the 1964 decision of New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan,2 however, the United States Supreme
Court recognized that the states' interest in protecting individual
reputation and the first amendment guarantees of free expression
are interrelated, competing values that must be balanced. During
the decade following New York Times, the Court attempted to define the proper accommodation between the law of defamation and
the first amendment.3 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,' the Court's most
recent decision concerning defamation, redefined the basis of liability, limited the award of damages, and modified the proof requirements for recovery by various classes of plaintiffs.- In addition,
Gertz delegated to the states responsibility for determining, within
the limits established by that case, the proper standard of liability
for defamation of a private individual. The states that currently
have responded to Gertz have not been uniform in their reasoning
or conclusions.' This Recent Development will examine the state
court reactions to Gertz, describe the reasons for the lack of uniformity in their conclusions, and suggest an approach to balancing
the first amendment and reputational interests.
1. The term "defamation," as used in this Recent Development, refers to both the
actions for libel and for slander. The distinction between the two causes of action, based
primarily upon the medium used to publish the defamatory remark, is unrelated to the
present inquiry. See note 9 infra and accompanying text.
2. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
3. The decisions following New York Times that concerned defamation and the first
amendment are: Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Ocala Star-Banner Co.
v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971); Monitor Patriot
Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971); Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n. v. Bresler, 398 U.S.
6 (1970); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S.
727 (1968); Beckley Newspaper Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967); Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S.
356 (1965); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
4. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
5. See notes 7-18 infra and accompanying text.
6. See notes 52-76 infra and accompanying text.
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LEGAL BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT

At common law, the cause of action for defamation was designed to protect the individual's interest in reputation. Because of
the importance attached to reputation, the publisher' of a defamatory statement was subject to strict liability. Liability arose upon
proof that the statement was published to a third party and could
be attributed a meaning that would injure the plaintiff's reputation.' If the plaintiff proved these elements, the defendant was liable
unless he could show that the statement was true or its publication2
privileged."' Privileges were of two types, absolute" and qualified,
and were based upon a policy that treated the benefit to be gained
by permitting publication of certain defamatory statements as
greater than the harm that might be done to personal reputation.'"
Two qualified privileges adopted in some jurisdictions were designed primarily to protect the media. One of these, the "fair comment" privilege, extended to the publication of unfounded conclusions based on accurate facts.'4 The other privilege peculiar to the
media, the "reporter's" privilege, protected fair and accurate reports of official proceedings.'" This privilege differed from the defense of truth, which protected any allegedly defamatory speech,
because the statements in the proceedings need only be shown to
have been reported accurately rather than to have been true.'" If the
7. The terms "publisher" and "publication," as used in the discussion of common law
defamation, refer to the communicator and communication of any defamatory statement. See
W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 113 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
8. Id.
9. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 558 (1938).
10. PROSSER, supra note 7, at § 114.
11. Absolute privileges, which provided the publisher with complete immunity, were
limited to communications related to certain governmental activities. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS §§ 585-592 (1976). Absolute privileges were based upon a policy that certain
persons, because of their special position or status, should not be deterred from making
communications by the risk that a trier of fact might find against them even when they have
acted reasonably and without malice. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Note,
Topic 2 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974).
12. Qualified privileges were effective only when exercised in a reasonable manner. The
reasonableness standard generally meant that the publisher must not have said more or have
communicated to a larger audience than necessary, that the publication must have had a
socially desirable purpose, and that the publisher must have had reasonable grounds for
believing what he said and must not have acted with improper motive. See Developments in
the Law-Defamation, 69 HARV. L. REv. 875 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Note, Topic 2 (Tent. Draft No. 20,
1974).
14. Developments, supra note 12, at 925-26.
15. Id. at 928.
16. Id.
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publisher was unable to establish a privilege in an action for defamation, then the plaintiff was entitled to recover presumed damages 7 without proof of actual harm, but was required to specifically
plead and prove special and exemplary damages."8
These common law rules were not modified substantially until
the Supreme Court's decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 9
which held that there are constitutional restrictions upon the cause
of action for defamation. In New York Times, a local government
official in Montgomery, Alabama brought an action for damages
arising from the publication of a defamatory advertisement in defendant's newspaper." Following a $500,000 judgment for the plaintiff,' the defendant newspaper petitioned the Supreme Court for
review, contending that its first and fourteenth amendment rights
had been violated.2 2 The Court recognized that the issue was
whether the common law standard of strict liability should be applied in an action brought by a public official against critics of his
official conduct.Y Basing its decision on the premise that media
discussion of public matters is an activity protected by the Constitution, the Court held that a public official may recover damages
from the media only upon proof that the defamatory statement
relating to his official conduct was made with "'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. '24 The Court characterized the
constitutional guarantee of free expression as a "profound national
commitment, ' 2' and recognized the absolute and qualified privi17. For all libel actions and certain actions for slander, damage to reputation was
presumed to have resulted from the publication. The jury was permitted to find substantial
damages on the basis of this presumption, and was required to return at least nominal
damages. Developments, supra note 12, at 934.
18. PROSSER, supra note 7, at § 115.
19. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
20. Respondent, one of three elected commissioners in Montgomery, Alabama, alleged
that he had been defamed by statements in a full-page advertisement published in the New
York Times on March 29, 1960. Although respondent was not mentioned by name, he contended that these statements attributed misconduct to him as the Commissioner who supervised the police department.
21. When New York Times was decided, four other defamation suits had been filed
against the Times by other Montgomery City Commissioners. One suit had resulted in a
$5(K),000 verdict, and the damages sought in the other three totaled $2,000,000. 376 U.S. at
277 n.18.
22. The source of the constitutional protection relied upon by the defendant was the
first amendment, which has been incorporated into the fourteenth amendment, and therefore
applied to the states. See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
23. 376 U.S. at 268.
24. Id. at 279-80.
25. Id. at 270.
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leges that were extended at common law to the discussion of public
matters. 2 The Court decided, however, that the privileges did not
protect sufficiently the constitutional guarantee of free expression,
particularly in light of the possibility of large judgments and the
requirement that the defendant bear the burden of proving truth.,
Reasoning that the common law privileges were insufficient to prevent "self-censorship" of the mass media, the Court concluded that
the Constitution required that strict liability should not be applied
in actions for defamation brought by public officials whose official
conduct has been criticized. The Court failed, however, to define in
detail its "actual malice" standard,2 and did not provide guidelines
for determining which parties and what acts fall within the "public
official, official conduct" category.29
In the decade following New York Times, the Court defined and
expanded the scope of its decision. Two leading cases decided after
New York Times gave content to the meaning of actual malice and
public official. First, in St. Amant v. Thompson, 31 the Court held
that actual malice could be established only when the defendant'32
"entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.
Secondly, the public official requirement was clarified in Rosenblatt
v. Baer,3" an action concerning the supervisor of a county-owned
recreation area. The Rosenblatt Court stated that the public official
designation applied to government employees "who have, or appear
to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over
the conduct of governmental affairs."' 3' Clear expansion of the New

York Times standard began in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,35

26. See notes 11-16 supra and accompanying text.
27. 376 U.S. at 277-79.
28. Rather than define its use of the term, the Court cited state court cases that had
used "actual malice." Id. at 280. For a discussion of the confusion that this created in the
lower federal courts see Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REv. 1349, 1370-71 (1975).
29. 376 U.S. at 283 n.23. The New York Times Court states:
We have no occasion here to determine how far down into the lower ranks of government
employees the 'public official' designation would extend for purposes of this rule, or
otherwise to specify categories of persons who would or would not be included.

Id.
30. See note 3 supra.
31. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
32. Id. at 731.
33. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
34. Id. at 85.
35. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Defendant magazine, The Saturday Evening Post, published
an article charging that plaintiff, the football coach at the University of Georgia, had conspired to "fix" a football game. The Court held that Butts, as a "public figure" who commanded a substantial amount of independent public interest at the time of the publication,
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when the public official concept was applied to "public figures."
Chief Justice Warren, in his concurring opinion, defined "public
figures" as those who "are intimately involved in the resolution of
important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events
in areas of concern to society at large. ' 31 The focus of the Court
shifted from individuals to issues in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc. '37 when the Court extended the New York Times standard of
actual malice "to all discussion and communication involving matters of public or general concern, without regard to whether the
persons involved are famous or anonymous."3 Although recognizing
that the holding in New York Times had been limited specifically
to situations concerning public officials, Justice Brennan's plurality
opinion3 1' contended that the first amendment concern was with the
free debate of all matters of public concern, regardless of whether
the plaintiff was a private individual. Consistent with this reading
of New York Times, the Rosenbloom opinion contended that society's interest in protecting individual reputation must often yield
to other important social goals." In a dissenting opinion, Justice
Harlan advocated the imposition of a negligence standard of liability for private individuals defamed by the news media." Harlan
reasoned that a private citizen who never sought publicity and who
has only limited access to the media for rebuttal deserves a greater
degree of protection than does a public figure or public official." A
majority of the Rosenbloom Court rejected the negligence standard
in actions for defamation, fearing that self-censorship of the mass
media would result from the inherent uncertainty of a reasonablehad to meet the Neu, York Times standard of proof in order to recover damages. The Court
found that the New York Times standard had been satisfied and awarded Butts damages.
36. Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
37. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). Plaintiff, a distributor of allegedly obscene magazines, brought
an action for defamation because of defendant's radio reports about police interference with
his business.
38. Id. at 44.
39. Five opinions were written in the Rosenbloom case. Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Blackmun joined in Justice Brennan's plurality opinion. Justice Black concurred in the
judgment, reiterating his position that the press is immune from liability for defamation.
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented, arguing that adoption of the New York
Times standard was inappropriate. Justice Harlan also dissented, and suggested that negligence might be an appropriate standard for private plaintiffs. Justice White, concurring in
the result, refused to join in any of the opinions, but decided that New York Times allows
the press to report police arrests. Justice Douglas did not participate in the decision.
For an extensive analysis of the Rosenbloom opinions see Keeton, Some Implications of
the ConstitutionalPrivilege to Defame, 25 VAND. L. REV. 59 (1972).
40. 403 U.S. at 49-50.
41. Id. at 66-72 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
42. Id.
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ness standard that would create the possibility of having to litigate
numerous claims. 3
The Court borrowed much of the reasoning of Justice Harlan's
Rosenbloom dissent in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.," the Court's
latest attempt to define the proper accommodation between the
constitutional guarantees of free expression and the law of defamation. In Gertz, an attorney claimed that an article published about
him in American Opinion, an organ of the John Birch Society, contained false and defamatory statements. The article described
plaintiff's representation of the family of a youth who had been shot
and killed by a Chicago policeman as part of a communist plot to
discredit the police. 5 The trial court entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the defendant magazine, concluding that
although plaintiff was not a public official or figure, the actual
malice standard applied because the article dealt with a matter of
public concern." After an extensive reevaluation of the questions
presented in the New York Times line of cases, the United States
Supreme Court reversed. The Court initially recognized that the
protection of debate on public issues must shield some false statements. Reasoning that the harm to reputation that resulted from
this protection was unavoidable, the Court held that liability without fault could not be imposed upon the publisher of a defamatory
statement concerning public matters." Secondly, the Court acknowledged the legitimate state interest in protecting individual
reputations. The Court decided that although the New York Times
standard was appropriate in actions concerning public officials or
figures, a more stringent standard of care was preferable in actions
maintained by all private plaintiffs, regardless of whether the publication concerned a matter of public interest.4 8 The Court referred to
the private plaintiff's lack of access to the media and his involuntary placement in public affairs as the rationale for the distinction
between public and private individuals.49 The Court refused to impose a specific standard upon the states. Instead, the Court held
that "so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the
43. d. at 50.
44. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
45. The article portrayed Gertz as the architect of a plot to frame a policeman who was
tried and convicted of second degree murder in connection with the killing. The article stated
that Gertz was a "Leninist" and a "Communist fronter." Id. at 326.
46. 322 F. Supp. 997 (1970).
47. 418 U.S. at 341-42.
48. Id. at 342-43.
49. Id. at 347.

1976]

RECENT DEVELOPMENT

1437

States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious
to a private individual.""' Thirdly, the Court observed that the common law doctrine of presumed damages often resulted in awards
disproportionate to actual injury. The Court found that because the
states have a legitimate state interest only in the compensation of
actual injury, recovery should be restricted to actual damages unless actual malice is shown.5 ' Thus the Gertz Court delegated to the
states the substantial responsibility of defining a standard of care
in defamation actions brought by private plaintiffs.
III.

STATE DECISIONS SINCE

Gertz

The courts of eighteen states 2 have considered the effect of
Gertz upon their law. Several of these courts have examined the
opinion without finding it necessary to rule on the standard of liability issue. Courts in Iowa,13 Louisiana, 4 and West Virginia, 5 for example, have discussed the implications of Gertz, but have employed
the New York Times standard upon a finding that the plaintiffs
before them were public figures. Intermediate appellate courts in
Florida and Texas apparently have decided that Gertz mandates
the imposition of the negligence standard in all private plaintiff
cases."'
50. Id.
51. Id. at 349-50.
52. Research for this paper was completed on September 20, 1976. As of that date, the
following decisions had been reported: Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 26 Ariz. App.
274, 547 P.2d 1074 (1976); Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 538 P.2d 450 (Colo. 1975);
Corbett v. Register Publishing Co., 33 Conn. Supp. 4, 356 A.2d 472 (Super. Ct. 1975); Firestone v. Time, Inc., 305 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1974); Helton v. UPI, 303 So. 2d 650 (Fla. App. 1974);
Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 543 P.2d 1356 (Hawaii 1975); Troman v. Wood, 62
Ill. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975); AAFCO Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest
Publications, Inc., 321 N.E.2d 580 (Ind. App. 1974); McCarney v. Des Moines Register &
Tribune Co., 239 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1976); Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531
P.2d 76 (1975); LeBoeuf v. Times Picayune Publishing Corp., 327 So. 2d 430 (La. App. 1976);
Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Lascola, 355 A.2d 757 (Md. 1976); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276
Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976); Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 330 N.E.2d 161
(Mass. 1975); Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569,
379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975); Commercial Programming Unlimited v. Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., Inc., 81 Misc. 2d 678, 367 N.Y.S.2d 986 (Sup. Ct. 1975); Thomas H. Maloney & Sons,
Inc. v. E.W. Scripps Co., 43 Ohio App. 2d 105, 334 N.E.2d 494 (1974); Martin v. Griffin
Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85 (Okla. 1976); Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 530 S.W.2d 611
(Tex. App. 1975); Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, 546 P.2d 81 (1976);
Sprouse v. Clay Communication, Inc., 211 S.E.2d 674 (W. Va. 1975).
53. McCamey v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 239 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1976).
54. LeBoeuf v. Times Picayune Publishing Corp., 327 So. 2d 430 (La. App. 1976).
55. Sprouse v. Clay Communication, Inc., 211 S.E. 2d 674 (W. Va. 1975).
56. Helton v. UPI, 303 So. 2d 650 (Fla. App. 1974); Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc.,
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Because of the limits placed upon the states by the Gertz decision,57 there are three realistic standards of care from which the
states may choose. One alternative would be to adopt the
Rosenbloom decision and hold that for recovery in actions brought
by private plaintiffs concerning an area of public interest, the plain-

tiff must show actual malice, as defined in New York Times and St.
Amant. "5 Another alternative would be to apply the New York
Times standard to all defamation actions, regardless of the nature
of the issue or the status of the plaintiff. The third alternative would
be to adopt the reasoning of the Gertz decision and apply the negligence standard to all defamation actions brought by private plaintiffs. Of the thirteen states "9 that have revised their standard of care
since Gertz, nine states"0 generally have adopted the third alternative and followed the Gertz reasoning. Although the Gertz Court did
not define a negligence standard, these state courts usually have
held that, in defamation actions brought by private plaintiffs, the
publisher is subject to liability if the publication was false and the
defendant either knew it to be false, or, believing it to be true,
530 S.W. 2d 611 (Tex. App. 1975). These cases have misread the Gertz holding, because they
do not consider the discretion granted to the states in defining their own standard of care.
See note 49 supra and accompanying text. The Florida Supreme Court apparently will face
the standard of care issue in the near future because the United States Supreme Court has
determined that Mary Alice Firestone, the former wife of a wealthy industrialist and the
plaintiff in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 96 S.Ct. 958 (1976), is not a public figure. The Court
remanded the case to the Florida courts for a decision on the liability of defendant magazine.
57. The primary constraint placed upon the state courts by Gertz is that they cannot
impose liability without fault. See note 80 infra.
58. See notes 24, 29, 32, 33 supra and accompanying text.
59. Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 26 Ariz. App. 274, 547 P.2d 1074 (1976);
Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 538 P.2d 450 (Colo. 1975); Corbett v. Register Publishing Co., 33 Conn. Supp. 4, 356 A.2d 472 (Super. Ct. 1975); Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park
Corp., 543 P.2d 1356 (Hawaii 1975); Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975);
AAFCO Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 321 N.E.2d 580
(Ind. App. 1974); Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76 (1975); Jacron
Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976); Stone v. Essex County Newspapers,
Inc., 330 N.E.2d 161 (Mass. 1975); Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d
196, 341 N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975); Thomas H. Maloney & Sons, Inc. v. E.W.
Scripps Co., 43 Ohio App. 2d 105, 334 N.E.2d 494 (1974); Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc.,
549 P.2d 85 (Okla. 1976); Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, 546 P.2d 81
(1976).
60. Corbett v. Register Publishing Co., 33 Conn. Supp. 4, 356 A.2d 472 (Super. Ct.
1975); Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 543 P.2d 1356 (Hawaii 1975); Troman v.
Wood, 62 Il. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975); Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223,
531 P.2d 76 (1975); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976); Stone v.
Fssex County Newspapers, Inc., 330 N.E.2d 161 (Mass. 1975); Thomas H. Maloney & Sons,
Inc. v. E.W. Scripps Co., 43 Ohio App. 2d 105, 334 N.E.2d 494 (1974); Martin v. Griffin
Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85 (Okla. 1976).
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lacked reasonable grounds for that belief.' A recent decision illustrating the rationale relied upon by these courts is Taskett v. King
Broadcasting Co.,2 an action arising from defamatory statements
made during a television news program. 3 The Washington Supreme
Court, which previously had adopted the Rosenbloom plurality
opinion," recognized the discretion granted to the states by Gertz.
Framing the issue in terms of a balancing of the conflicting interests
of free speech and reputation, the court stressed that "these two
competing values must be tempered so that neither social requisite
be destroyed." ' The Taskett court recognized that the New York
Times decision was based upon the need to perpetuate an uninhibited marketplace of ideas, but criticized that decision for its failure
to take into account the state's interest in providing its citizens with
a remedy for defamation. 6 Although the court conceded that the
New York Times standard was appropriate for public officials and
figures, it found that, because of the "overriding"" state interest in
protecting private plaintiffs, the actual malice standard was inappropriate for actions by private plaintiffs. The court recognized that
some self-censorship of the media might result from its decision, but
suggested that greater caution concerning publication of matters
involving private plaintiffs may be desirable."' Also, the court reasoned that self-censorship often arose from the uncontrolled discretion of juries to award judgments disproportionate to actual harm,
and concluded that this would be mitigated by the constraints
placed by Gertz upon defamation judgments. 9
A minority0 of states that have considered the question have
61. At least one court has decided that the conduct of the reasonably careful publisher
or broadcaster in the community or in similar communities is determinative of reasonable
care. Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76 (1975).
62. 86 Wash. 2d 439, 546 P.2d 81 (1976).
63. A television station owned by defendant had broadcast a story concerning plaintiff's
financial difficulties. Specifically, the telecast stated that plantiff had traveled to Mexico to
avoid his creditors. In fact, plaintiff had filed for statutory dissolution of his corporation and
was vacationing for a short time in Mexico City.
64. In Miller v. Argus Publishing Co., 79 Wash. 2d 816, 490 P.2d 101 (1971), the Washington court had applied Rosenbloom, characterizing it as the "constitutionally required
rule." The Miller case concerned a series of articles published by the defendant newspaper
that discussed plaintiff's role in local political affairs.
, 546 P.2d at 86.
65. 86 Wash. 2d at 66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.; see note 51 supra and accompanying text.
70. Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 26 Ariz. App. 2d 274, 547 P.2d 1074 (1976);
Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 538 P.2d 450 (Colo. 1975); AAFCO Heating & Air
Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 321 N.E.2d 580 (Ind. App. 1974); Chapa-
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refused to follow the Gertz and Taskett approach of imposing a
negligence standard of care. Although none of these courts has
extended the New York Times standard to all defamation actions,
they have adopted the Rosenbloom plurality opinion and held that
a private individual who brings a defamation action concerning an
event of general or public interest must prove that the defamatory
falsehood was published with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for whether it was true. A leading case following this
approach is AAFCO Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest
Publications, Inc. , 7 an action arising from a series of defamatory
newspaper articles.7 2 The AAFCO court initially stated that it
sought an accommodation between society's interest in freedom of
expression and the state's interest in protecting the reputation of
private individuals.:1 The court then cited the Indiana constitution
as authority that the interchange of ideas upon all matters of public
concern must be unimpaired. 74 The AAFCO court refused to attach
any significance to the plaintiff's status as a public official or figure
or a private individual, stating that once a matter of general or
public interest is recognized, the status of the plaintiff becomes
insignificant.75 The court contended that the negligence standard
was unacceptable primarily because self-censorship would result
from its imposition. Self-censorship was likely, the court suggested,
because of the uncertainty attendant upon a reasonable care standard and the possibility of large judgments. 7 The AAFCO court,
therefore, found that the imposition of the Rosenbloom standard
was necessary to ensure vigorous, free debate of public issues. Thus
a survey of exemplary state defamation decisions since Gertz indicates divergence in both the reasoning process used by the courts
and the conclusions they have reached.
deau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61
(1975).
71. 321 N.E.2d 580 (Ind. App. 1974).
72. In AAFCO, defendant newspaper published a series of articles contending that
plaintiff had failed to obtain the necessary permits for electrical work done on a single family
dwelling. The house had burned, and two children died in the fire. Plaintiff had in fact
obtained the necessary construction permits.
73. Id. at 586.
74. See note 97 infra and accompanying text.
75. 321 N.E.2d at 587.
76. Id. at 588-89.
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THE BALANCING PROCESS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND REPUTATIONAL
INTERESTS

The task facing the states in the wake of the Gertz decision is
a difficult one. Despite the apparently irreconcilable conflict between the first amendment interests in uninhibited exchange of
information and the states' interest in protecting individuals from
defamatory falsehoods, the states have been charged with striking
a delicate balance between the two by defining the standard of
liability for defamation. By establishing the requirements for recovery by a private plaintiff, each state is able to effectuate its desired
balancing of these interests. For example, when the standard of
liability imposed by a state for a private plaintiff's recovery becomes
more stringent, protection of first amendment interests diminishes
and protection of reputation is enhanced. These effects occur because the media is exposed to liability in a greater number of situations, resulting in increased self-censorship of both accurate and
inaccurate information." Simultaneously, the citizens of a state
benefit from careful media screening of defamatory falsehoods and
from more lenient proof requirements for recovery of damages. Conversely, relaxation of the standard of liability values first amendment interests over individual reputation. With a more lenient standard, the media, because it is exposed to liability in fewer instances,
may become less cautious in its criticism of private individuals.
Simultaneously, defamed persons find it more difficult to vindicate
their rights because of the more demanding proof requirements.
Thus adoption of the more stringent negligence standard of liability,
as in Taskett v. King BroadcastingCo. ," represents a determination
that the states' interest in protecting reputation is great relative to
the importance of first amendment interests in free speech. At the
other end of the spectrum, imposition of the actual malice requirement, as in AAFCO Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest
Publications, Inc.," indicates that the importance of first amendment interests has been found to outweigh the interests in protecting reputation.
As has been discussed above,8" there are only three standards
of liability from which the states may choose:8' alternative A im77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
liability

See notes 27-29 supra and accompanying text.
86 Wash. 2d 439, 546 P.2d 81 (1976); see notes 62-69 supra and accompanying text.
321 N.E.2d 580 (Ind.App. 1974). See notes 71-76 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 57 & 58 supra and accompanying text.
Realistically, the Gertz holdings limit the states to these 3 alternatives. Because
without fault is prohibited, the states cannot constitutionally impose a standard of
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poses the standard adopted in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. ;8"
alternative B requires a showing of actual malice by all private
plaintiffs; and alternative C adopts the negligence standard that
was preferred in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.83 In selecting the alternative that will effectuate a proper balance between constitutional
and reputational interests, the state courts should focus upon several policy considerations that have been identified by the United
States Supreme Court in the line of defamation cases following New
York Times. 4 The weight to be attached to the interest in protecting
individual reputation must be determined by the plaintiff's need for
state aid in protecting his reputation from defamatory falsehoods.
This need must, in turn, be ascertained by reference to the attributes of the defamed individual; his ability to gain access to the
media to refute false accusations and the extent to which he has
placed himself in the forefront of public affairs, thereby "assuming
the risk" of adverse commentary. 5 The importance of first amendment interests in free speech, which are to be balanced against the
reputational interests, is measured by the extent to which the public
debate necessary for effective self-government will be inhibited by
self-censorship of the media that results from apprehension of defamation suits.86
In New York Times and its progeny, the Supreme Court has
balanced the needs of plaintiffs who are public figures or officials
against the first amendment interest in protecting free debate. The
cases have concluded that, because public figures have ready access
to the media and have voluntarily placed themselves in the public
eye, imposition of the actual malice standard achieves the proper
accommodation of constitutional and reputational interests when
they are plaintiffs. The states which have adopted alternative A,"7
the Rosenbloom standard, have reasoned that the first amendment
interest in protecting uninhibited discussion of public matters is no
less important than the interest in uninhibited discussion of the
activities of public officials. These states have concluded that the
care more stringent than negligence. A standard of care less stringent than actual malice
would be paramount to an absolute privilege to defame, and would ignore completely the
states' legitimate interest in protecting personal reputation. Within these boundaries, there
are a limited number of workable standards. See Robertson, Defamation and the First
Amendment: In Praiseof Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEXAs. L. Rxv. 199 (1976).
82. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
83. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
84. See note 3 supra.
85. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
86. Id.
87. See note 70 supra.
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standard of liability that is imposed when the plaintiff is a public
figure should, therefore, also be imposed when a private plaintiff is
defamed concerning a matter of public interest." Although these
courts have correctly characterized the first amendment values as
equivalent in the two situations, it does not follow necessarily that
the same standard of liability should be applied in both. The courts
that have adopted this line of reasoning have failed to examine the
countervailing reputational interests. The examination would reveal that the state's interest in protecting individual reputation
increases dramatically when the defamed party is a private citizen.
The private individual involved in a matter of public concern does
not have the access to the media enjoyed by public figures and
officials, and, in addition, has not assumed the risk of being defamed by placing himself in a position of public prominence. Thus
the net result of the balancing process is a decrease in the relative
value of first amendment interests in uninhibited communication
and an increase in the need to protect individual reputation. Retention of the actual malice standard in cases concerning matters of
public interest fails to reflect a proper balancing of both constitutional and reputational interests because it does not acknowledge
the special needs of a plaintiff who is not a public figure or official.
A further argument against adoption of alternative A is that, unlike
the determination of whether a person is a public figure or official,
the question whether a matter is of public concern often depends on
whether the media themselves make it one.9 5 Thus it is argued that
under the Rosenbloom standard the media themselves determine
when they are entitled to the additional protection of the actual
malice limitation on recovery for defamation.'
Alternative B, which requires a showing of actual malice by all
private plaintiffs regardless of whether they are involved in a public
matter, possesses all the shortcomings of alternative A and magnifies them by its expanded application of the actual malice standard.
Courts choosing this alternative would not only apply the actual
88. See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
89. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 71-72 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting), wherein Justice Harlan castigated the Court for its failure to balance first amendment
and reputational interests, characterizing the plurality's approach as "single-minded devotion to the task of preventing self-censorship."
90. See, e.g., Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975), which concerned
an article that implied that plaintiff's home was being used as the headquarters of a juvenile
gang that had committed a series of burglaries. The defendant newspaper claimed that the
article concerned a matter of public interest.
91. Id.
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malice requirement to private plaintiffs who are defamed in connection with a matter of public concern, but would go one step farther
and also apply the requirement to private individuals who are defamed concerning a matter of only private interest. This extension
of the Rosenbloom standard serves merely to accentuate the imbalance inherent in alternative A. When a private plaintiff has been
defamed concerning a private matter, the weight of the reputational
interests has increased because of the greater need for state protection of reputation. In addition the first amendment interests in
protecting free speech, which are measured by the extent to which
public debate necessary for self-government is inhibited by selfcensorship, have diminished. The increased self-censorship that
would result by imposing a more stringent standard of liability when
a private plaintiff has been defamed regarding a private matter
would not inhibit the public debate that is protected by the first
amendment. Private matters are not relevant to effective selfgovernment and do not, therefore, fall within the protection of the
first amendment.12 Thus the first amendment interests are relatively unimportant in this situation. Alternative B fails to reflect the
results of this balancing process, which favors reputational interests
over first amendment interests when private matters, rather than
public ones, are the subject of media inquiry.
The remaining alternative, adoption of the negligence standard
preferred by Gertz in all actions brought by plaintiffs who are not
public figures or public officials, is the only standard of liability that
achieves the desired balancing of first amendment guarantees and
the interests in protecting individual reputation. Because the private plaintiff, unlike the public figure or official, lacks the means
to protect his reputation without state aid, he is dependent upon the
courts for vindication of his interests. Alternative C recognizes that
the special needs of the private plaintiff require a more stringent
standard of liability than is imposed when the plaintiff is a public
figure or official who has ready media access and has voluntarily
assumed the risk of defamatory comment by placing himself in the
public eye. The question facing the states is not whether all self92. Even those states adopting alternative A, the Rosenbloom standard, have pointed
out that freedom of expression requires "that the interchange of ideas upon all matters of
'general or public interest' be unimpaired." AAFCO Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v.
Northwest Publications, Inc., 321 N.E.2d 580, 586 (Ind. App. 1974) (emphasis added). See
also Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 538 P.2d 450 (Colo. 1975); Chapadeau v. Utica
Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975). None of
these courts has contended that the first amendment is concerned with matters of only
private interest.
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censorship of the media should be prevented, but, rather, what
degree of self-censorship effectuates a reasonable accommodation of
93
both first amendment interests and the needs of a private plaintiff.
The Gertz standard of liability achieves this reasonable accommodation of both interests when the plaintiff is a private citizen. Just
as liability without fault intolerably inhibits free expression by
causing extensive self-censorship of the media,9" imposition of a
standard of liability less stringent than alternative C intolerably
burdens defamed private individuals by preventing vindication of
their rights. Each state is, of course, free to sacrifice the reputational
interests of its citizens to prevent all self-censorship of the media,
but that approach fails to recognize that a certain degree of selfcensorship may be desirable to protect private plaintiffs and that a
reasonable balance can be attained by adoption of the Gertz standard.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although the balancing approach outlined above indicates that
the negligence standard of liability should be adopted, a different
result may be mandated in some states by circumstances that attach special significance to either of the competing interests that are
being balanced. For example, four states have based their decisions
under Gertz on the apparent dictates of state constitutional provisions. 5 Two of these states, Kansas and Oklahoma, have interpreted
their free expression clauses as requiring special deference to reputational interests, and have, therefore, adopted the Gertz standard of
negligence for actions maintained by private individuals. 6 An Indiana court has found that its constitution mandates that the interchange of ideas remain unimpaired, and, in order to accommodate
the increased importance of free expression in that state, adopted
93. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 135, 147, 153 (1967).
94. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
95. Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 543 P.2d 1356 (Hawaii 1975); AAFCO
Heating and Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 321 N.E.2d 580 (Ind. App.
1974); Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76 (1975); Martin v. Griffin
Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85 (Okla. 1976).
96. Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76 (1975) (interpreting § 11
of the Kansas Bill of Rights); Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85 (Okla. 1976)
(interpreting Art. II, § 22 of the Oklahoma Constitution). The language of these two provisions is substantially the same. Art. II, § 22 of the Oklahoma Constitution reads in pertinent
part:
Every person may freely speak, write, or publish his sentiments on all subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of that right. . ..
OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 22.
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the Rosenbloom standard." The fourth state, Hawaii, determined
that the provisions of its constitution pertaining to free expression
were substantially the same as the federal Constitution, and, therefore, required adherence to alternative C, the Gertz negligence standard. 8 Circumstances such as these, which are peculiar to the individual states, properly are considered in determining an appropriate
standard of liability. The state courts should be aware, however,
that a decision to adopt a particular standard because of special
circumstances may have repercussions beyond its borders. Possible
interstate effects arise because a statement published in one state
may create liability for defamation in another state.9 Because national magazines, large newspapers, and national broadcasting networks are subject to the requirements of the defamation laws in all
of the states in which they operate, the standard of liability adopted
by one state may affect their conduct in another. To illustrate, if
one state within an organization's area of publication adopts a
negligence standard and another retains the actual malice requirement, the publisher must adhere to the more stringent negligence
standard or expose himself to liability in that state. The end result
is that the negligence standard guides the publisher's conduct in all
of the states in which he operates. A state which has determined
that the proper balance between reputational and constitutional
interests is reflected in the actual malice standard finds that the
greater amount of self-censorship connected with the negligence
etandard is being exercised within its borders, at least by those
publishers who also operate within the state which has adopted the
negligence standard. 0°
The state courts must, of course, be guided by conditions within
their own boundaries, but they should not adopt a standard of lia97. AAFCO Heating & Air Conditiong Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 321 N.E.2d
580 (Ind. App. 1974). The Indiana Constitution provides:
No law shall be passed, restraining the free interchange of thought and opinion, or
restricting the right to speak, write, or print, freely on any subject whatever: but for the
abuse of that right, every person shall be responsible.
IND. CONsT. art. I, § 9.
98. Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 543 P.2d 1356 (Hawaii 1975). Art. I, § 3
provides in pertinent part:
No law shall be enacted . . . abridging the freedom of speech or of the press.
HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 3.
99. The New York Times case illustrates this possibility. Although printed in and
distributed from New York, the Times was found liable for defamation in the Alabama state
courts.
100. For a more detailed discussion of lack of uniformity among the states as a cause
of media self-censorship, see 12 CALIF. WESTrERN L. Rsv. 172, 186-88 (1975).
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bility based on special circumstances without carefully considering
the effects of their actions on surrounding states. More importantly,
special circumstances should not become the focal point of the
state's inquiry to the degree that they obscure the essential nature
of the state's task-accommodation of both constitutional and reputational interests by careful balancing.
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